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Citizens are frequently misinformed about political issues and candidates but the circum-
stances under which inaccurate beliefs emerge are not fully understood. This experimental
study demonstrates that the independent experience of two emotions, anger and anxiety,
in part determines whether citizens consider misinformation in a partisan or open-minded
fashion. Anger encourages partisan, motivated evaluation of uncorrected misinformation
that results in beliefs consistent with the supported political party, while anxiety at times
promotes initial beliefs based less on partisanship and more on the information environ-
ment. However, exposure to corrections improves belief accuracy, regardless of emotion
or partisanship. The results indicate that the unique experience of anger and anxiety can
affect the accuracy of political beliefs by strengthening or attenuating the influence of
partisanship.
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Politics are not devoid of emotion. Rather, emotions are a core component of citizen-
ship that shape how people see their political world (Marcus, 2002). Emotions have a
powerful influence on political attitudes and behaviors (Brader, 2005; Marcus, MacK-
uen, & Neuman, 2011; Nabi, 2003), but might they also affect what citizens perceive
to be political reality?
Political misperceptions, which are characterized as personal beliefs about poli-
tics that are inaccurate based on the best available evidence (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit,
Schwieder, & Rich, 2000), are prevalent in American politics and held about a range
of political issues and candidates (Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Weeks & Garrett, 2014). The
prevailing understanding for why misperceptions emerge is based on the theory of
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partisan motivated reasoning and suggests that political information consistent with
an individual’s ideology or partisanship is more likely to be believed, regardless of
its veracity (e.g., Garrett & Weeks, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Certainly, partisan-
ship matters for political beliefs and misperceptions often fall along party lines, as
Democrats and Republicans vary in their accuracy regarding the facts about politics
(Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007). However, this partisan-based
explanation for political misperceptions may be incomplete, as research has not fully
identified the conditions under which politically biased evaluations of misinforma-
tion occur.
This study contributes to our understanding of political misperceptions by argu-
ing that citizens’ emotional experiences can enhance or lessen partisanship’s influence
on inaccurate beliefs. The focus here is on the effects of two negative emotions: anxi-
ety and anger. Although the literature is beginning to recognize the influence of these
emotions on motivated reasoning, the differential effects of anger and anxiety in this
process are not fully understood, nor have they been explored in the context of mis-
perceptions. Prior research has focused primarily on the influence of anxiety, showing
that the experience of this emotion can attenuate the effect of existing attitudes on
political evaluations (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele & Marcus, 2010; Marcus et al., 2011;
Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). Less attention has been paid to the effects
of anger onmotivated reasoning, thoughMacKuen et al. (2010) found that angry indi-
viduals were less likely to seek out attitude-challenging information and less willing
to compromise politically. While prior work suggests anxiety and anger may uniquely
affect partisan processing, it has neither isolated the causal influence of each emo-
tion, nor has it fully assessed whether these emotions’ influence extends to explicitly
partisanmotivations or to the accuracy of political beliefs.
To address these theoretical gaps, this experimental study manipulates emotional
states, partisan cues, and the information environment (presence of a corrective mes-
sage or not) to better understand how political misperceptions are formed.The results
demonstrate that participants at times respond to uncorrected misinformation in dif-
ferent ways when angry or anxious, resulting in divergent beliefs about a series of
inaccurate political claims. When false claims go uncorrected, anger exacerbates the
influence of partisanship andmakes participants more susceptible to party-consistent
misinformation—claims they are predisposed to believe because of their political
affiliation. Conversely, anxiety lessens the influence of partisanship when considering
uncorrected misinformation and increases the likelihood that a claim disseminated
from the opposed political party is believed. This study provides a more complete
theoretical explanation for how political misperceptions are initially established, as
well as a causal account of how anger and anxiety uniquely affect partisan processing
of political news and information.
Partisanship and political misperceptions
The formation and persistence of political misperceptions are often attributed to a
politically motivated need for consistency (e.g., Meirick, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010;
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Weeks & Garrett, 2014; though, cf. Garrett, Nisbet, & Lynch, 2013). The theory of
motivated reasoning suggests individuals at times evaluate information in a biased
manner in order to remain consistent with prior attitudes or beliefs (Kunda, 1990). In
the case of politics, this means citizens are often motivated to consider new informa-
tion through a partisan or ideological lens (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Partisan motivated
reasoning is presumed to be driven by affective-based goals that lead citizens to eval-
uate attitude-consistent information as strong, convincing, and valid, while incon-
sistent information is considered weak and unconvincing (Taber & Lodge, 2006). In
the context ofmisperceptions, the theory suggests that political claims consistent with
one’s partisanship or ideology aremore likely to be accepted, regardless of their verac-
ity. In contrast, claims are more likely to be rejected if they challenge existing partisan
attitudes. Empirical evidence supports this contention, as misinformation regarding
political candidates or issues is typically more likely to be believed when it is con-
sistent with party identification or ideology (Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler,
2010; Weeks & Garrett, 2014).
However, citizens do not always interpret political information in a way that
is biased toward their partisan leanings but instead at times consider informa-
tion in a more even-handed manner (Bullock, 2009; Druckman, 2012; MacKuen
et al., 2010). This willingness to set aside partisanship is evident with misinfor-
mation too, as citizens occasionally believe false, attitude-discrepant claims and
reject attitude-consistent ones. For example, a poll conducted in 2012 found nearly
one-third of Democrats incorrectly believed or did not know if Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, a misperception that
seems to contradict Democrats’ opposition to the war at that time (Valentino, 2012).
Surveys fielded during the 2012 presidential election show between approximately
10 and 20% of Democrats believed or were unsure whether Barack Obama was born
in the United States, while between 30 and 50% of Republicans dismissed this claim
as false (Cassino, 2013; Gallup, 2011).1 So although citizens are more likely to hold
attitude-consistent misperceptions, partisan motivated reasoning appears to have
limits. The influence of party identification might be conditional but scholars have
not fully identified when partisanship affects false beliefs. The following sections
argue that anxiety and angermoderate partisanship’s influence when citizens consider
the veracity of misinformation.
Anxiety and anger
Despite sharing a negative valence, the emotions anxiety and anger exhibit several
distinct qualities that should lead to different responses to misinformation. Emo-
tions are “internal, mental states representing evaluative, valenced reactions to events,
agents, or objects that vary in intensity… [t]hey are generally short-lived, intense,
and directed at some external stimuli” (Nabi, 1999, p. 295). Emotions play a key role
in how people interact with stimuli they encounter in their environment and differ-
ent emotions are distinguished by unique goals andmotivations, cognitive appraisals,
and action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman,Wiest, & Swartz, 1994).
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Anxiety is an aversive and motivational state that occurs in response to threatening
stimuli in one’s environment (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Marcus,
Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). Anxiety is associated with uncertainty, a lack of per-
sonal control, and high levels of physiological arousal, all of which lead people to
develop strategies to reduce such feelings (Eysenck et al., 2007). Anger is a negatively
valenced emotion that is triggered when an individual’s goals are blocked, when one
feels slighted, or when a perceived injustice or violation of standards has occurred
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Anger is associated with perceptions of certainty
and individual control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and results in behaviors that seek
restitution, often by causing harm to or punishing others (Carver & Harmon-Jones,
2009; Frijda, 1986).
Although anger and anxiety often co-occur and are not mutually exclusive,
evidence demonstrates these emotions can result in divergent political outcomes
(Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Anxiety increases
political information seeking, learning, and deliberation, whereas anger depresses
each and promotes close-mindedness (MacKuen et al., 2010; Redlawsk et al., 2010;
Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008). Anger and anxiety are also associated
with differences in support for various political policies. Anxiety (or fear) can increase
support for conciliatory and precautionary policies whereas anger (or known threat)
boosts punitive policy support (Goodall, Slater, & Myers, 2013; Nabi, 2003). These
unique outcomes of anger and anxiety make it clear that conceptualizations of
emotions need to move beyond positive or negative valence (Nabi, 2010).
Emotion and partisan bias
Politically motivated reasoning is thought to be “driven by automatic affective
processes that establish the direction and strength of biases” (Taber & Lodge, 2006,
p. 756) but the observed differences between anxiety and anger suggest not all affective
responses, even those of the same valence, work in the same way. Evidence suggests
the experience of anxiety can diminish the effects of motivated reasoning as people
form political evaluations. According to the theory of Affective Intelligence, novel and
uncertain political situationsmay trigger feelings of anxiety (Marcus et al., 2000).This
anxiety motivates people to take action against that impending threat by more care-
fully considering each of the various alternatives at their disposal, even information
that challenges existing attitudes. Because they pay closer attention to the information
at hand and aremore likely to weigh opposing viewpoints, the subsequent evaluations
made by anxious individuals are less likely to be based on prior attitudes, partisan-
ship, or ideology and are more heavily influenced by contemporary information
(Brader, 2005; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000). For example, voters who
were anxious about their preferred party’s candidate were more likely to reconsider
their vote choice and pay closer attention to the candidates’ policy positions and
personality characteristics, which at times resulted in an intention to vote against
their party’s candidate (Marcus et al., 2011). Redlawsk et al. (2010) directly tested the
hypothesis that anxiety is associated with a reduction in attitudinal bias by exposing
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participants to large amounts of politically incongruent information. They find evi-
dence of an “affective tipping point” in which encountering a high volume of negative
information about a preferred political candidate was associated with increases in
anxiety, which was subsequently related to more negative evaluations of the initially
liked candidate. This evidence suggests that anxiety may attenuate partisan bias.
Conversely, anger may enhance the motivated reasoning process. Anger arises in
response to aversive stimuli in the environment and in order to deal with this anger,
people may become defensive, dismiss attitude-challenging information, seek infor-
mation that supports their position, or rely more heavily on prior dispositions in their
evaluations (MacKuen et al., 2010;Marcus et al., 2011). Angry individuals are also less
likely to consider and learn from new information (Valentino et al., 2008).
Taken together, this prior work suggests that anxiety and anger should differ-
entially interact with partisanship to affect beliefs, but many important questions
remain. The current study builds on work by Redlawsk et al. (2010) and MacKuen
et al. (2010) in several important ways. First, evidence of a causal effect of anger and
anxiety onmotivated reasoning has been elusive.2 Neither study directly manipulated
these emotions, which prohibits clear tests about the differential effects of anxiety
and anger in the motivated reasoning process (and Redlawsk et al. only examined
anxiety). Second, emotions in these studies were generated by exposing participants
to various amounts of information that either challenged or was consistent with their
preferences. What is still unclear theoretically is whether general anxiety or anger
about a political issue, independent of the type or volume of information exposure,
can affect partisan processing. Third, the two studies did not test whether the effects
of anxiety and anger extend to explicitly partisan motivations. The Redlawsk et al.
study was limited to a primary election context and did not test for the effects of
partisanship. Similarly, MacKuen et al. examined the effects of emotions on political
bias in the context of a political policy and did not examine the role of partisan affili-
ation. The omission of partisanship in these studies is important in light of criticisms
that emotions are often rationalizations of partisan preferences (Ladd & Lenz, 2008).
Yet, research has frequently shown that the effects of emotions on political behavior
are exogenous to or interactive with partisanship (see Brader, 2011) and the current
study is designed to further test this possibility. Finally, while existing studies focus on
how emotions may moderate the effect of political bias on information seeking and
evaluations of political issues and candidates, the present study examines whether
these emotions affect assessments of political facts, which may help explain some
uncertainties regarding when partisan bias influences belief accuracy.
Anxiety, anger, and political misperceptions
People should respond to political misinformation quite differently when experi-
encing anxiety or anger. Anxiety should increase the likelihood that individuals
carefully consider a wider range of viewpoints, even those they may disagree with,
which should diminish the influence of partisanship and increase the impact of
contemporary information in evaluation (MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2011;
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Redlawsk et al., 2010). In the case of misinformation, this suggests that anxious indi-
viduals exposed to counterattitudinal corrections should more carefully weigh false
claims versus facts, which should increase the corrections’ effectiveness. Specifically,
when a correction is provided, anxious individuals exposed to misinformation from the
in-party will hold more accurate beliefs than those in a neutral emotional state (H1a).
Although the influence of anxiety initially appears to be normatively beneficial for
democracy because it may lead to more rational updating, there is also the possibility
for adverse effects (Marcus, 2002). For instance, people primed to experience high lev-
els of anxietywhowere then exposed to an anti-free-speechmessagewere significantly
less tolerant politically compared to those who received a low anxiety prime (Marcus,
Sullivan,Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005). In the case of political misinformation, anx-
iety could make individuals more susceptible to uncorrected false claims that reflect
negatively on their own party. Because they are less likely to be driven by partisan
motivations, anxious citizens should pause and more carefully consider the nature of
the misinformation when it conflicts with their party affiliation (Marcus et al., 2011).
As a result, anxious individuals who receive uncorrected misinformation from the
out-party will hold less accurate beliefs than those in a neutral emotional state (H1b).
Anger, however, should enhance the influence of partisanship on false beliefs.
Anger makes people defensive and increases the likelihood that they ignore infor-
mation that challenges their attitudes and pay closer attention to attitude-consistent
information (Marcus et al., 2011). As a result, anger leads to evaluations that are based
more heavily on existing dispositions, such as partisanship. MacKuen et al. (2010)
found that angry individuals sought out more information that confirmed their prior
attitudes, became resolute in those prior attitudes, and were less willing to compro-
mise politically. Extending these findings to misperceptions, anger should result in
less openness to new, attitude-challenging information contained in a fact-checking
message and an unwillingness to hear the other side. Thus, anger should enhance the
influence of partisanship on beliefs, as people will be more likely to fall in line with
their political party when they are angry. As a result, angry citizens should be more
susceptible to inaccurate claims endorsed by a member of their preferred political
party and less likely to accept corrections that indicate their party’s claims are wrong.
In particular, when a correction is provided, angry individuals exposed to misinforma-
tion from the in-party will hold less accurate beliefs than those in a neutral emotional
condition (H2a). Also, angry individuals exposed to uncorrected misinformation from
the in-party will hold less accurate beliefs than those in a neutral emotional state (H2b).
Method
An online, between-participants experiment tested these hypotheses. English-
speaking adults over age 18 who live in the United States and have access to the
Internet participated in the study (N = 768). The sampling firm Qualtrics recruited
the sample using an opt-in panel, and the data were collected between 25 March
and 2 April 2014. The sample was diverse in terms of age (M= 47.99, SD= 14.05),
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gender (50% male), race (83.3% White, 8.5% Black, and 7% Hispanic), education
(22.0% high school or less, 25.3% 4-year college degree, and 11.6% postgraduate), and
political party affiliation (43.6% Democrat or leaning, 29.6% Republican or leaning,
and 23.7% Independent).
Procedure
Qualtrics first sent panel members an email asking them to participate in the study.
After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned to take at least 2 min-
utes to write something about either immigration reform or the death penalty (issue
manipulation) thatmakes them either angry or anxious (emotionmanipulation). Par-
ticipants in a control condition wrote about something that makes them relaxed. Sim-
ilar tasks have been used in prior research and allow for the independent induction of
each emotion related to the target issue (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Valentino, Brader,
Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). Although this writing task gener-
ates emotions somewhat artificially, in the real world people frequently use strong
emotional language to express their opinions online (Papacharissi, 2012), and news
organizations’ websites are filled with uncivil and emotional comments (Coe, Kenski,
& Rains, 2014). The writing task is thus a reasonable representation of how peo-
ple express themselves politically outside of the experiment. Immediately following
the writing task, participants provided their current emotional state by reporting the
extent to which they were experiencing a series of emotions.
Matching the issue they wrote about in the emotional induction, participants next
read a news article attributed to the Associated Press that discussed how public mis-
perceptions were circulating around the political debate on either immigration or the
death penalty (see Appendix S1, Supporting Information, for sample stimuli). The
articles were manipulated to contain either A) a series of four inaccurate and uncor-
rected claims (misinformation-only) about the issue, or B) the same claims as well as
corrective information providing explicit evidence showing why the statements are
false (correction). The two issues were used as a form of stimulus sampling, which
improves construct and external validity (Wells & Windschitl, 1999). The political
affiliation of the source of the original misinformation was also manipulated such
that the inaccurate information was attributed to either Congressional Republicans or
Democrats. The corrective information in the correction condition was attributed to
a fictional independent fact-checking organization. The news articles were fictitious
but were based on realistic presentations of misinformation in the media. Outside
of the laboratory, the public can be exposed to misinformation presented without
explicit corrections via news or political websites, blogs, and e-mail (Garrett, 2011;
Weeks & Southwell, 2010), while news organizations and fact-checking organizations
such as Fact-check.org often rebut political inaccuracies by presenting both the orig-
inal claim and an evidence-based correction (Gottfried, Hardy, Winneg, & Jamieson,
2013). The claims were explicitly false and based on real misperceptions surround-
ing each issue. The factual statements used as corrections were created using evi-
dence from reports by experts at governmental organizations and nonpartisan interest
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groups. Immediately after reading their assigned news article, participants reported
their beliefs in the claims presented in the article. The study concluded by assessing
psychological individual differences and demographics.
Measures
Emotion
Dummy coded variables were created to represent the emotional induction condi-
tions. Both the anger and anxiety conditions were coded high and the neutral control
conditionwas used as the reference group. Allmodels in the analysis use the induction
condition dummy variables as predictors.
Source of misinformation
The source of the original misinformation was manipulated such that claims were
attributed to either Congressional Republicans or Democrats. A dichotomous vari-
able was created to represent whether the source of the misinformation was from
the political party participants supported or opposed. If, for example, a self-reported
Republican (or leaning) saw an article in which the false claims were attributed to
Congressional Republicans, that combination would be coded as “in-party.” If a
Democrat saw that same article that combination would be coded as “out-party.”
This resulted in a dichotomous variable in which 287 participants read an article
attributing the misinformation to the out-party, while 275 participants saw claims
stemming from members of their in-party (coded high). This coding excludes true
Independents who did not lean toward one party, participants associated with a third
party, or those who did not respond to the political affiliation question.
Correction
The presence of a correction (coded high) was manipulated such that inaccurate
claims were presented either with or without evidence indicating the claims were
not true.
Political knowledge
Political knowledge is often associatedwith politicalmisperceptions andwas included
as a control in the models (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Political knowledge was measured
using questions about the current make-up of Congress, the party of the President
who appointed the current Chief Justice of the SupremeCourt, the current unemploy-
ment rate, and the current U.S. Secretary of State. The items were summed, creating a
range of possible scores from 0 to 4 (α= .65,M= 2.00, SD= 1.37).
Belief in false claims
Belief accuracy was the dependent variable and was measured by asking partic-
ipants to report the extent to which they believed each of the four claims they
read to be true or false. Participants were asked: “The article you just read made
several claims about immigration (the death penalty). What do you think about the
accuracy of these statements? For each statement listed below, please tell us if you
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think it is definitely true, probably true, probably false, definitely false or you are
unsure?”
Participants who read the immigration article were asked to report their belief
in the following false claims: (a) Illegal immigrants are able to receive government
welfare benefits like food stamps and housing benefits; (b)Themajority of immigrants
do not learn to speak English; (c) Immigrants are more likely to become criminals
than native born citizens; and (d) Proposed legislation will allow any current illegal
immigrant to become a citizen.
Participants who read the death penalty article reported their belief in four sepa-
rate claims: (a) The number of inmates executed in the United States is growing; (b)
Minorities are more likely to be executed than Whites; (c) It is legal to execute juve-
niles in the United States; and (d) Public support for the death penalty has increased
in recent years.
Prior to analyses, responses were recoded so that the “unsure” response was
located at the midpoint of the revised 5-point scale. Higher values on the scale
represent greater accuracy in assessing these false claims.3 On average, participants’
perceptions of the four immigration claims were not very accurate, as the mean was
at the midpoint of the 5-point scale (four items averaged scale, α= .75, M= 2.99,
SD= 1.06). Beliefs about the death penalty claims were more accurate, as the mean
fell between the “unsure” and “probably false” response options (four items averaged
scale, α= .74, M= 3.19, SD= 1.07). A t-test confirmed that beliefs about the death
penalty were significantlymore accurate than those about immigration, t(766)= 2.52,
p< .05. The issues were combined for analyses (M= 3.09, SD= 1.07) but the issue
variable served as a control throughout.
Although these scaled items are used to test the hypotheses, converting the
belief items into dichotomous measures of accuracy helps illustrate the distribution
of correct responses. All four claims about both issues were false, so participants
who responded “probably false” or “definitely false” were credited with providing
the correct or accurate response. Across the entire sample, participants provided
the correct response to just under half of the four claims (range 0 to 4; M= 1.89,
SD= 1.39). Table 1 displays the percentage of participants with correct beliefs by
condition, as well as the mean number of correct responses in each condition. Across
the entire sample, one in five participants (20.8%) did not provide a correct response
to any of the four claims, while 17.1% were accurate in assessing all claims.4
Results
Emotion induction check
An induction check demonstrates the writing task generated the intended emotional
response. Emotional responses were assessed on a scale from 1 (very slightly or
not at all) to 5 (extremely) and randomly presented items were used to measure
anger (angry, outraged, and disgusted; α= .90,M= 1.83, SD= 1.08), anxiety (anxious,
afraid, and nervous; α= .84, M= 1.83, SD= 0.93), and enthusiasm (enthusiastic,
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Table 1 Percentage of Participants With Correct Beliefs by Condition
Number of Correct Beliefs (%)
Condition 0 1 2 3 4
Mean Number
Correct (SD)
Emotion
Anger 19.1 25.2 18.8 18.8 18.2 1.94 (1.40)
Anxiety 22.5 20.7 25.3 16.5 15.1 1.91 (1.34)
Neutral 21.4 19.6 17.3 23.8 17.9 2.06 (1.42)
Party of source
In-party 21.8 23.3 18.9 18.5 17.5 1.87 (1.41)
Out-party 16.7 20.6 23.0 20.6 19.2 2.04 (1.36)
Information environment
Misinformation only 29.4 26.0 24.5 14.5 5.6 1.50 (1.22)
Correction 11.1 18.1 16.7 24.2 30.0 2.45 (1.38)
Issue
Immigration 23.8 23.3 20.2 17.9 14.8 1.75 (1.40)
Death penalty 17.8 21.2 21.5 20.2 19.4 2.16 (1.34)
Entire sample 20.8 22.3 20.8 19.0 17.1 1.89 (1.39)
Note:Beliefs were collapsed into a dichotomousmeasure and considered accurate if respondent
reported that the false claim was “probably” or “definitely” false.
hopeful, and proud; α= .84, M= 2.69, SD= 1.14). Anger and anxiety were positively
correlated, (r= .56, p< .001), while anger and enthusiasm were negatively correlated
(r=−.06, p< .10 [two-tailed]). Anxiety and enthusiasm were positively correlated
(r= .12, p= .001).
Participants asked to write something that made them angry reported more
anger (M= 2.10, SD= 1.17) than participants in the anxiety (M= 1.78, SD= 1.06) or
neutral conditions (M= 1.42, SD= 0.75), F(2,764)= 23.61, p< .001. The difference
in anger between the anger and anxiety conditions was also significant, t(597)= 3.50,
p< .001. Participants who wrote about what made them anxious reported more
anxiety (M= 1.95, SD= 1.00) than participants in the anger (M= 1.78, SD= 0.88)
or neutral conditions (M= 1.71, SD= 0.89), F(2,764)= 4.04, p< .05. A direct
comparison of anxiety between the anxious and angry conditions was significant,
t(597)= 2.15, p< .05. Finally, those in the anxiety condition felt more anxiety than
anger, t(284)= 3.23, p< .001, while participants in the anger condition experienced
greater anger than anxiety, t(313)= 5.35, p< .001.
Statistical analyses
Although main effects of the experimental conditions were not hypothesized, the
result of an ordinary least squares regression predicting belief accuracy without the
interaction terms is reported (Table 2, Model 1). The hypotheses were tested using
two separate “moderated moderation” regression models, also known as three-way
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Table 2 Effects of Anxiety and Anger, Partisanship, and Corrections on Belief
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Anxiety −.14 (.11) −.42 (.19)* −.15 (.11)
Anger −.09 (.11) −.09 (.11) .26 (.18)
Correction (coded high) .78 (.08) *** .70 (.15)*** .98 (.15)***
In-party (coded high) −.13 (.08) −.35 (.15)* .15 (.15)
Anxiety× In-party — .63 (.24)** —
Anxiety×Correction — .27 (.24) —
Correction× In-party — .23 (.21) −.36 (.22)#
Anxiety×Correction× In-party — −.71 (.35)* —
Anger× In-party — — −.64 (.23)**
Anger×Correction — — −.45 (.24)#
Anger×Correction× In-party — — .79 (.34)*
Issue (death penalty coded high) .27 (.08)** .27 (.08)** .27 (.08)**
Political knowledge .15 (.03)*** .15 (.03)*** .15 (.03)***
Constant 2.18 (.18)*** 2.25 (.19)*** 2.02 (.20)***
Observations 561 561 561
F (df ) 20.46 (6, 554) 13.07 (10, 550)*** 13.16 (10, 550)***
R2 .18 .192 .193
Notes:Unstandardized regression coefficients reported. Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are two-tailed.
#p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
interactions (Hayes, 2013).The first model tested the hypotheses about anxiety, while
the second examined predictions related to anger.The hypotheses make different pre-
dictions about the interactive effects of emotions and partisanship on belief accuracy
depending on the information environment and the three-way interaction models
allow for such tests. Table 2 (Models 2 and 3) illustrates that the three-way interac-
tion between the emotion, partisan source, and correction variables is significant in
both themodel for anxiety, b=−.71 (.35), p= .04 (two-tailed) and anger, b= .79 (.34),
p= .02 (two-tailed). These significant coefficients indicate that the extent to which
the two emotions and partisanship interact to affect beliefs is contingent on the pres-
ence of a correction. What the coefficients do not indicate, however, is the precise
nature of these interactions. In order to examine these conditional effects and test
the specific hypotheses posed in this study, these significant interactions were fur-
ther probed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013, p. 307). Probing the interactions allows for
direct comparisons of the hypothesized group differences. PROCESS provides infer-
ential tests that explain the nature of the emotion× partisan source interactions in
both the misinformation-only and correction conditions. In reporting the results of
the hypotheses tests below I focus on the coefficients for these inferential tests (which
in this case signify adjustedmean differences between groups) as well as the estimated
marginal means for the groups being compared.
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Tests of main effects
The coefficients reported in Table 2 (Model 1) indicate there were no main effects of
the anger or anxiety conditions on participants’ beliefs (ps> .20). The coefficient for
the variable representing partisanship was negative, b=−.13 (.08), suggesting that
participants who received misinformation from the in-party held less accurate beliefs
than those who received the same information from the out-party. However, this
effect was not significant (p= .11) and cannot be taken as strong evidence regarding
the direct influence of partisanship. The lack of main effects suggests that emotions
and the partisan source of the information alone did not significantly affect belief
accuracy.5 There were main effects of the issue (beliefs about the death penalty were
more accurate) and correction manipulations, as participants who received correc-
tive information held significantlymore accurate beliefs than those who received only
the misinformation.The coefficient for the correction variable suggests that all things
equal, receiving a correction was estimated to improve belief accuracy by .78 units
(t= 9.29, p< .001). In addition, the control variable political knowledgewas positively
related to belief accuracy, b= .15, p< .001.
Hypotheses tests
H1a predicted that when a correction is available, anxious individuals exposed to
misinformation from the in-party hold more accurate beliefs than those in the
neutral condition. In other words, corrections that challenge one’s partisan loyalties
are more effective when anxiety is present. This hypothesis was tested by examining
the coefficient for the anxiety× partisan source interaction within the correction
condition. The coefficient was not significant, b=−.08 (.25), t=−.33, p= .75, indi-
cating that anxiety and the partisan source do not interact to affect beliefs in the
correction condition. Exploring this nonsignificant interaction further illustrates that
false claims attributed to the in-party were nomore likely to be rejected in the anxiety
condition (M= 3.29, SE= .15) than in the neutral condition (M= 3.52, SE= .12)
when a correction was available, b=−.23 (.20), t=−1.18, p= .24 (see in-party, right
half of Figure 1). Thus, H1a is not confirmed.
H1b posited that when misinformation goes uncorrected, anxious individuals
who receive false claims from the out-party will hold less accurate beliefs than those
in the neutral condition. In the misinformation-only condition, the interaction
between the anxiety and partisan source variables is positive and significant, b= .63
(.24), t= 2.61, p= .009 (two-tailed). Probing this interaction indicates that beliefs of
anxious individuals who were exposed to uncorrected misinformation attributed to
the out-party (M= 2.52, SE= .15) were significantly less accurate than those in the
neutral condition (M= 2.94, SE= .11), b=−.42 (.19), t=−2.25, p= .02 (two-tailed)
(see out-party, left half of Figure 1). H1b is therefore supported as anxiety (compared
to neutral emotional state) reduced belief accuracy when evaluating uncorrected
misinformation stemming from the out-party.
H2a predicted that when a correction is available, beliefs of angry individuals
exposed to misinformation from the in-party will be less accurate than those in
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Figure 1 Predicted belief accuracy by experimental condition and anxiety induction.
Notes: Bars represent estimated marginal means by condition, after controlling for issue, the
anger condition, and political knowledge. Belief is measured on a 1–5 scale with higher scores
corresponding to more accuracy. Error bars denote standard error.
a neutral emotional state. This hypothesis is tested by focusing on the interaction
between the anger dummy and partisan source variables within the correction
condition. The nonsignificant coefficient for this interaction demonstrates that the
influence of anger and partisanship are not dependent on one another in the cor-
rection condition, b= .15 (.25), t= .60, p= .55. Additional assessments of the data
further indicate that when a correction is presented, false claims from the in-party
are no more likely to be believed when participants are angry (M= 3.41, SE= .15)
than when they are in a neutral emotional state (M= 3.46, SE= .12), b=−.04 (.19),
t=−.23, p= .82 (see in-party, right half of Figure 2). As a result, H2a is not supported.
H2b predicted that when misinformation is not corrected, angry individuals who
receive false claims from the in-party will hold less accurate beliefs than individuals
in a neutral emotional state. In the misinformation only condition, the interaction
between the anger and partisan source variables is negative and significant, b=−.64
(.23), t=−2.73, p= .01 (two-tailed), suggesting that anger enhances the effect of
partisanship on belief. Probing the interaction revealed that belief accuracy for angry
participants exposed to uncorrected misinformation from the in-party (M= 2.45,
SE= .13) was significantly lower than those in the neutral condition (M= 2.83,
SE= .11), b=−.38 (.18), t=−2.14, p= .03 (two-tailed) (see in-party, left half of
Figure 2). The findings therefore support H2b; anger reduced belief accuracy when
evaluating uncorrected, party-consistent misinformation.
Discussion
Emotions play an important role in how people respond to uncorrected political
misinformation.This study provides causal evidence that the independent experience
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Figure 2 Predicted belief accuracy by experimental condition and anger induction.
Notes: Bars represent estimated marginal means by condition, after controlling for issue, the
anxiety condition, andpolitical knowledge. Belief ismeasured on a 1–5 scalewith higher scores
corresponding to more accuracy. Error bars denote standard error.
of anger and anxiety at times has different consequences for political misperceptions
by heightening or dampening the influence of partisanship. When initially faced
with inaccurate claims about politics, angry people are more likely to process the
information in a partisan manner, which results in beliefs that reinforce their party
affiliation. In contrast, anxiety reduces the reliance on partisanship at this initial
stage and leads to beliefs that are consistent with information contained in the
message. In this study political misperceptions appear to stem not from partisanship
alone, but rather from an interaction between emotions, party identification, and the
information environment.
Relying extensively on the theory of partisan motivated reasoning, previous
research has shown that partisanship is related to inaccurate political beliefs (Nyhan
& Reifler, 2010; Weeks & Garrett, 2014). However, to date this work has not fully
illustrated when party affiliation impacts misperceptions. The current study provides
one explanation. The results here suggest that the partisan motivated reasoning pro-
cess may be facilitated by anger rather than anxiety or general negative affect, as anger
resulted in initial beliefs that were consistent with party identification. This raises the
possibility that the “automatic affective processes” that are thought to lead to biased
processing of information might be limited to the discrete emotion anger rather than
other negative emotions or general negative affect (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 756). It
may be that political attitudes alone are not enough to drive partisan processing of
misinformation, but rather attitudes that are tied to anger or resentment. We know
there are limits to partisan motivated reasoning (Druckman, 2012; MacKuen et al.,
2010; Redlawsk et al., 2010), and people do not necessarily believe derogatory claims
about the other side simply because they are Republican or Democrat. Rather, the
combination of anger and partisanship might be what leaves themmisinformed.This
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process could help explain why many Republicans believe false information about
Barack Obama. For example, 64% of Republicans said it was “probably true” that
Obama was hiding information about his birthplace in 2013 (Cassino, 2013), which
roughly coincides with the percentage of Republicans (58%) who expressed anger
at Obama during that time period (Steinhauser, 2013). The interaction of anger and
partisanship to facilitate belief in uncorrected misinformation is especially troubling
given that anger also depresses information seeking and increases selective exposure
(MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2008). Anger therefore has the potential to
create media diets in which people are primarily exposed to like-minded messages,
whichmay further enhance anger directed at political opponents (Slater, 2007). It will
be important for future research to examine the potential reinforcing and dynamic
influence of anger.
The effects of anxiety provide a theoretical explanation for why people occasion-
ally believe misinformation that is inconsistent with their partisan affiliation (e.g.,
Democrats who believe Obama was not born in the United States). Anxious par-
ticipants (vs. neutral) who only received misinformation saw a significant decrease
in belief accuracy when exposed to inaccurate information stemming from the
out-party. Partisanmotivated reasoning would suggest these individuals should reject
this misinformation because it challenges their partisanship. Yet that is not what hap-
pened. Insights from Affective Intelligence theory help us understand why this seem-
ingly counterintuitive result should actually be expected. Recall anxiety arises out of
novel political circumstances and depresses the role of prior attitudes and increases
the influence of contemporary information in evaluations (MacKuen et al., 2010; Red-
lawsk et al., 2010). In the present research, consider Democrats asked to write some-
thing that makes them anxious about immigration reform. This experienced anxiety
may have signaled that something is wrong with their position or their party’s stance,
which should increase the willingness to consider the information at hand (Marcus
et al., 2011).When these Democrats are subsequently presented with misinformation
originating from the Republican Party they do not automatically process this infor-
mation in a partisan way. Instead, their beliefs are influenced more by the content of
the message. They are more likely to pay closer attention to what the out-party has
to say and, when corrective information is not available, have a higher probability of
beingmisinformed. Although anxiety has typically been discussed as an emotion that
facilitates democratic thinking and open-mindedness, this suggests a paradox of anx-
iety.That is, anxiety promotes critical thinking and learning about politics, but it may
backfire if the information considered is inaccurate or misleading (Marcus, 2002).
This study does provide reasons to be hopeful about the nature of political mis-
perceptions. Corrections to misinformation were effective, even in the face of emo-
tional experiences and partisan motivations. Whether corrections are effective has
been a primary question driving misperception research and the results of prior work
are mixed. How are these conflicting findings to be reconciled? First, corrections to
attitude-consistent beliefs can be effective as long as they don’t require a change in
attitude (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin, 2014). The claims in this study are
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likely not a critical component of people’s partisan identity, so admitting they are false
after seeing strong, corrective evidence did not require people to change their feelings
about their political party. In this case, the correctionsmay update beliefs but attitudes
toward the political party remain unchanged. Second, the correctionsmight have been
successful here due to a “tipping point.” Even strong partisan motivated reasoners are
willing to give up on their position when exposed to an abundance of information
telling them they are wrong (Redlawsk et al., 2010). Given that the corrections pro-
vided strong arguments for why each of the claims was false, it is possible that even
angry participants for whom the corrections were inconsistent with their partisanship
could no longer engage inmotivated processing.Thismay also help explain why some
prior experimental research has failed to find corrective effects for counterattitudinal
misperceptions. In many of those studies, the correction comes in the form of a brief
passage embedded in a news article (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) or a subtle identifi-
cation of the misinformation (Garrett & Weeks, 2013), which may not offer enough
contradictory evidence to reach a tipping point. While both of these possibilities are
plausible, it will be critical for future research to further outline the conditions and
processes related to successful corrective messages.
The study’s experimental design provides the opportunity to examine causal fac-
tors that influence misperceptions but it also creates some limitations. Notably, the
results reported here are based on a single experiment, making replication essential.
The controlled design using a large, politically and demographically diverse sample,
as well as the use of stimuli sampling, suggest the findings are not limited to a single
political issue or particular subgroup but future research should examine these effects
in different contexts.
A strength of this study is that it provides a causal tests of the unique effects of
anxiety and anger on partisan bias. However, the benefits of this design come with
some drawbacks. The emotional inductions did not direct participants to write about
a particular partisan target of their emotion related to the issue. It is possible that
participants in the anxiety condition noted something about the out-party’s stance
on the issue that made them anxious. This may have limited the study’s ability to
find effects in the correction condition, given that anxiety about one’s own party or
position on an issue, not the opposition’s, attenuates bias (Marcus et al., 2011). This
limitation is a tradeoff that was necessary to test the possibility that these emotions
uniquely affect partisan motivated reasoning. Some scholars argue that emotions are
often the result of preexisting political attitudes (Ladd & Lenz, 2008), so a stringent
test of the theory required that anger and anxiety be induced without any explicit
partisan cues. In addition, there was concern that directing attention to partisan
considerations about these issues would have inflated anger in the anxiety condition,
thus preventing a clean test of the distinct effects of each emotion. So although the
writing task comes with disadvantages, it was necessary to isolate the effects of anger
and anxiety from each other, as well as from partisanship.
The emotion induction raises another notable limitation. Participants in the neu-
tral condition were not asked to write about immigration or the death penalty, which
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creates the possibility that mere salience of the issue, not the experience of emotions,
affected the results. It is also possible that the emotional inductions created nega-
tive thoughts about the issue, which directly affected belief accuracy. However, the
evidence suggests this threat is limited as there was no main effect of emotion on
belief, indicating that the induction task alone did not affect perceptions. In addition,
the differential interactive effects of anxiety and anger are consistent with theory and
demonstrate that the unique experience of these emotions, not simply writing about
the issue, influenced what people believe.
Another limitation involves the false claims used. The misinformation here was
not widely known and did not receive media attention prior to fielding the study. It
is possible the effects observed here might be different with long-standing misper-
ceptions that have been in the public sphere for years. Studies attempting to correct
well-known misperceptions have shown the task to be more difficult (e.g., Nyhan &
Reifler, 2010) and the format of the corrections used here may work differently with
prominent misperceptions in the real world.
Despite these limitations, this study offers a unique theoretical contribution
to the study of political misperceptions. Using a highly controlled experimental
design, this research directly addresses the question of why people hold political
misperceptions by providing causal evidence that two negative emotions—anxiety
and anger—uniquely work in connection with other factors to influence people’s
responses to inaccurate information. It is clear from this work that political beliefs
are formed not by a single consideration but rather by a set of interacting influences
including emotion, partisanship, and the information environment. Examining how
these components work together—not in isolation—will better serve us as we seek
to understand the problem of political misperceptions.
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Notes
1 Redlawsk, Tolbert, & McNeely (2014) find fear exacerbated effects of symbolic racism on
evaluations of Obama and a similar mechanism may exist with Democrats’ misperceptions
about Obama.
2 Brader (2005) demonstrated experimentally that anxiety can alter candidate preferences.
However, his study was not directly interested in emotions’ effects on partisan motivated
reasoning, nor did he examine the effects of anger.
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3 Some evidence indicates that survey responses to factual questions do not always represent
true beliefs, but rather are expressions of partisan loyalty (e.g. Bullock, Gerber, Hill, &
Huber, 2013; Prior, Sood, & Khanna, 2013). Although this suggests that partisan
differences in factual perceptions may be overstated, research indicates that self-reported
misperceptions, whether true beliefs or not, can independently affect democratic outcomes
such as support for political policies (Kuklinski et al., 2000) and vote choice (Weeks &
Garrett, 2014).
4 The study does not take into account participants’ prior knowledge on these issues, which
could affect belief accuracy. For example, being knowledgeable about these issues should
improve accuracy, and it is possible that participants who reported accurate beliefs did so
because they knew the right answer from the start and not because the corrections were
effective. However, given that the experimental design incorporated random assignment,
any bias generated from prior knowledge should be evenly distributed throughout the
sample.
5 It is possible that respondents would not believe scenarios in which Democrats spread
misinformation about immigration or Republicans promote false claims about the death
penalty, given each party’s general position on those issues. Two analyses of variance
(controlling for the emotion and correction conditions and political knowledge)
demonstrate a main effect of participants’ political affiliation, as Republicans held less
accurate beliefs than Democrats about immigration (F(1,270)= 6.62, p= .01), while
Democrats were less accurate than Republicans about the death penalty (F(1,275)= 4.52,
p= .03). However there was no main effect of the political party of the source of the
misinformation on belief for either immigration (F(1,270)= 1.44, p= .23) or the death
penalty (F(1,275)= 1.33, p= .25). More importantly, there was no interaction between the
participants’ party affiliation and the partisan source of the misinformation for either issue
(immigration: F(1,270)= 2.38, p= .12; death penalty: F(1, 275)= 2.28, p= .13). This
indicates that neither Republicans’ nor Democrats’ beliefs about these issues depended on
the political party attributed as the source of the misinformation.
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